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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. Introduction
The state argues that Mr. Standley’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
based solely on counsel’s failure “to object on res judicata grounds to the re-filing of
Count 1 of the state’s motion to revoke his probation.” State’s Brief, pg. 5. In fact,
he argued that counsel’s performance was deficient “because she failed to object to a
second evidentiary hearing on the same allegation the court found had not been
proved.” R 11. Mr. Standley argued that there were two bases for objection: 1)
“[t]here is no rule or statutory authority permitting relitigation of alleged probation
violations” and 2) the relitigation was barred by res judicata. Id. The district court
granted the state’s motion for summary disposition “ruling that for purposes of res
judicata, no final judgment was entered on the first probation revocation hearing.”
R 470.
B. Argument in Reply
1. Res judicata applies here.
The state argues that res judicata does not apply to previous rulings made in
the same case. It, however, fails to cite to an Idaho case which so holds.
Moreover, while Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 (1983), states that
“res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply if a party moves the rendering
court in the same proceeding to correct or modify its judgment,” the state in this
case was not asking the court to correct or modify its judgment. It did not claim the
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court ruled incorrectly the first time. It just wanted another chance to present the
evidence which it failed to present the first time. Further the state fails to mention
that the Supreme Court prevented relitigation of the claim in Arizona v. California,
even though the district court was asked to modify a ruling in the same case. It
wrote that “a fundamental precept of common-law adjudication is that an issue once
determined by a competent court is conclusive. ‘To preclude parties from contesting
matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their
adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves
judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the
possibility of inconsistent decisions.’” Id., quoting Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 153-154 (1979).1
The other federal and out-of-state cases string-cited by the state (State’s
Brief, pg. 8-9) involve cases where the trial court had rule-based or statutory
authority to reconsider a previous ruling. There is no rule of procedure in Idaho
which permits the refiling of a probation violation after the court has determined
the state failed to carry its burden of proof at the first hearing. Those cases are
neither controlling nor apposite. See e.g., Thompson v. Paul, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1113,
1119 (D. Ariz. 2009) (where reconsideration was authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b))
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In addition, the Supreme Court cited with favor the section of the
Restatement of Judgments cited by Mr. Standley in his Opening Brief. Arizona v.
California, 460 U.S., at 617 ft. 7, citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13,
Comment e (1982) (“A judgment may be final in a res judicata sense as to a part of
an action although the litigation continues as to the rest”).
2

and Pac. Emplrs. Ins. Co. v. Sav-A-Lot, 291 F.3d 392, 399 (6th Cir. 2002) (where the
court declined to apply res judicata because “there was no final judgment on the
merits.”); Smith v. Hruby-Mills, 380 P.3d 349 (Utah App. 2016) (where trial de novo
was authorized by state code); see also Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com., 23
P.3d 43, 51 (Cal. 2001) (where the Court held that “the superior court’s later
judgment was void insofar as it encompassed or rested upon a redetermination of
the merits of the litigation”).
Moreover, as the state acknowledges, “neither the state’s cross-motion for
summary disposition nor the district court’s order alleged or found (respectively)
that the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in the same (or unitary) hearing.”
State’s Brief, pg 16. Thus, this Court should not even consider that theory for the
first time on appeal because Mr. Standley was never given the notice required by
I.C. § 19-4906(b). Under that provision, the district court may sua sponte dismiss a
petitioner’s post-conviction claim only if the court provides the petitioner with notice
of its intent to do so, the ground or grounds upon which the claim is to be dismissed,
and twenty days for the petitioner to respond. Under I.C. § 19-4906(c), the district
court may also dismiss a petitioner’s post-conviction claims on the motion of either
party. If the State files and serves a properly supported motion to dismiss, further
notice from the court is ordinarily unnecessary. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,
817, 892 P.2d 488, 492 (Ct. App. 1995). The reason why subsection (b), but not
subsection (c), requires a twenty-day notice by the court of intent to dismiss is that,

3

under subsection (c), the motion itself serves as notice that summary dismissal is
being sought. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995).
When the state’s motion fails to give notice of the grounds, the court may not
grant summary dismissal unless it first gives the petitioner twenty days notice of
intent to dismiss and the grounds therefore, pursuant to Section 19-4906(b). Flores
v. State, 128 Idaho 476, 478, 915 P.2d 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1996). “This procedure is
necessary so that the petitioner is afforded an opportunity to respond and to
establish a material factual issue.” Mallory v. State, 159 Idaho 715, 721, 366 P.3d
637, 643 (Ct. App. 2015).
Notwithstanding the above, the state contends that notice is unnecessary in
this case because the question of the applicability of res judicata is purely a question
of law. State Brief, pg. 11. (Notably, it does not cite to a case to support the
application of a “futility” exception to the statutory requirement.) In any case, the
legal response to the state’s argument is set forth above. Further, the failure to give
notice to Mr. Standley is not harmless because he has been deprived of the
opportunity to develop the evidentiary record as to his other factual basis for relief,
i.e., that trial counsel’s failure to object to the relitigation was deficient because
there is no rule or statute which permits such relitigation. Had the state or court
given notice that it might rule that res judicata was categorically not applicable in
the case, Mr. Standley would have broadened his argument beyond the res judicata
claim and supported his alternative theory more robustly. Or he could have
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amended his petition to allege that the relitigation was barred by the law of the case
doctrine. “As most commonly defined, the doctrine posits that when a court decides
upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in
subsequent stages in the same case.” Arizona v. California, 460 U.S., at 618. Thus,
even if a futility doctrine existed, it would not be applicable in this case.
Nor did the state’s generic statement that “[t]here is no bar to refiling the
allegation” give notice of a theory that res judicata was categorically inapplicable.
This is manifest when the entire argument is read, as it is clear that the state is
saying res judicata does not apply in this case solely due to the absence of a final
judgment.2

2

The entire paragraph reads:

The Court should reject Petitioner’s argument that res judicata
precludes the State from refiling a motion to revoke probation after the
District Court’s dismissal upon evidentiary findings. Res judicata
stands for the proposition that a “final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies, and as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to
a subsequent action involving the same claim.” Black’s Law Dictionary,
(Sixth Ed., 1991). On Count I, there was no “final judgment” rendered
after the first evidentiary proceeding when the Court dismissed the
State’s probation violation allegation regarding unapproved
associations. There is no bar to refiling the allegation. Therefore, no
legal basis exists to sustain the objection Petitioner claims his counsel
should have made. Counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing
to raise an issue upon which he could not succeed. Maxfield v. State,
108 Idaho 493, 700 P.2d 115 (Ct. App 1985).
R 387 (emphasis added). The germane portion of the argument is in italics, while
the state selectively quotes only the underlined portion.
5

2. There was a final judgment on the merits.
As to the question of whether Judge Stoker’s ruling that the state had not
proved the probation violation at the first hearing was a final judgment on the
merits, the state simply argues that Mr. Standley “reads too much into [State v.]
Dempsey[, 146 Idaho 327, 193 P.3d 874 (Ct. App. 2008)].” State’s Brief, pg. 14.
That is not the case. The fact of the matter is that there was no final appealable
order from the probation violation proceedings in Mr. Dempsey’s 1999 case when it
was used to prevent the relitigation of the same probation violation in the 2002
case. Any argument to the contrary is less than totally candid. Since the nonappealable order in Mr. Dempsey’s case was found by the Court of Appeals to be a
final judgment on the merits in Dempsey, the same must be true here.3 As Dempsey
was issued prior to the probation violation proceedings here, defense counsel should
have been aware of it and objected to the relitigation on that basis. The failure to
object was deficient performance under Strickland.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Wesly Standley asks this Court to vacate the
order summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition and remand to the district
court for further proceedings.
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This is confirmed by the iCourt dockets, which the state concedes were
“included in the record below, and presumably considered[.]” State’s Brief, pg. 21.
6

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of April, 2018.

/s/Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Wesly Standley
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